

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

ACTION

FROM: Richard T. Kennedy

May 13, 1970

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting Wednesday, 13 May 1970

DOS, ARMY, NAVY,  
NSC, JCS & OSD  
review(s) completed.

There are a number of issues remaining from the meeting of May 12.  
These include:

-- U.S. Participation in Naval Operations in Cambodian Waters.

-- ARVN Operations Toward Takeo

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-- Policy on Extended ARVN Operations in Cambodia

[Redacted]

-- Aircraft (T-28's) for Cambodia

MORI C03232988

-- Aircraft (Munitions) for Cambodia

-- [Redacted]

25X1

Your talking points address these issues and also address the following issues not previously discussed:

-- U.S. Captured Cambodian Combatants

[Redacted]

1. U.S. Participation in Naval Operations in Cambodian Waters.

-- The South Vietnamese have begun this operation. They recommended that the area to be covered be extended westward -- this would go beyond the 21-mile limit of U.S. Operations. MACV (in response to a question) announced intention to participate in this operation using guidance previously agreed by the WSAG on 8 May. The announcement, however, indicated the area to be covered as extending to 103° 49' East rather than 104° as previously agreed.

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Attached to Spewer WSAG memo, 13 May 1970

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- Should we approve the extension westward? How should this be explained publicly?
- Have the South Vietnamese agreed to the rules of engagement which the U.S. set for this operation?
- Is the U.S. participating in the operation? (Secretary Laird indicated reservations about U.S. participation until South Vietnamese agreed to the rules of engagement.)

2. ARVN Operations Toward Takeo

- Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird wanted to review the proposed operation which included relieving pressures on Takeo before approval. (The operation is scheduled to begin May 16.) Secretary Rogers was to be briefed on 12 May.
- Should this operation be approved?
- If the ARVN proposes to conduct the operation using its own forces, should there be U.S. support or advisor participation?

3. Policy on Extended ARVN Operations in Cambodia

- Ambassador Johnson agreed to redraft a proposed guidance cable concerning extended ARVN operations in Cambodia. The objective was to discourage them from becoming involved in situations in which our choice might boil down to either bailing them out or letting them suffer a major defeat. At the same time we want to retain a posture in which potential ARVN operations in Cambodia are a credible threat in the eyes of the ARVN/VC. We also want to be kept fully informed by the GVN of its plans. (Mr. Nutter agreed to make suggestions for Ambassador Johnson's use.) 25X1

- You might wish to review the draft instruction.

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-- Forces to be Recruited in Vietnam for use in the Parrot's Beak.  
General Abrams had proposed that he recruit and train additional Khmer in South Vietnam for use in the Parrot's Beak after GVN forces withdraw. (U.S. support would end June 30.) The WSAG agreed to this proposal on 7 May.

-- Has Abrams been authorized to go ahead with this program?

-- Are funds available to support the program (DOD funds would be required).

25X1

5. Aircraft (T-28's) for Cambodia

-- Because of the difficulties of providing aircraft to Cambodia, the WSAG agreed to look into the possibility of increased GVN air support for Cambodia and also to ascertain what maintenance support assistance the Vietnamese Air Force might be able to give Cambodia. Defense was to raise this with MACV.

-- Has there been any report from MACV?

-- What is the assessment of the military utility of these aircraft for Cambodia? (General Vogt agreed to provide this assessment at the meeting on 12 May.)

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
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6. Aircraft Munitions for Cambodia (SEE TAB 2)

- The Cambodians have asked for munitions for T-28's (they have six T-28's operational). The Air Attache and Charge' in Phnom Penh recommend we provide this.
- Can we make the munitions available through GVN?
- Should we instruct General Abrams to deliver the munitions through the GVN?

7.




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8. U.S. Captured Cambodian Combatants (SEE TAB 3)

- Ambassador Berger has pointed to possible problems in dealing with Cambodians captured by U.S. forces. He notes that it may be difficult to distinguish between Cambodians serving with VC/NVA units and those who may be involved in hostile acts separate from VC/NVA actions; raises possible question of advisability of transporting non-Vietnamese Cambodians across the border to Vietnamese PW camps; and points out the need to determine what Cambodia wants the U.S. or GVN to do with captured Cambodians.
- Ambassador Johnson was to work with Defense to sort out the handling of these PWs and the policy to be followed.
- Are there any unresolved problems?

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